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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the beginning of the broadband era, regulators have expressed concern 
that vertically integrated broadband service providers (“BSPs”)—those provid-
ers who control access to last mile connections as well as affiliated content—
possess the ability and the incentive to discriminate against unaffiliated content 
and applications providers, such as online video content providers.1 The focus 
of the concern has been to assure the neutral treatment of data traffic associated 
with the provision of basic Internet access service.2 Over the last few years, the 
market for the home delivery of video-programming services has been in dise-
quilibrium due, in part, to technological developments, one of the most impor-
tant being the dramatic increase in wireline broadband Internet connection 
speeds in the last mile (also referred to as the local loop).3 Two events accom-
                                                
 1 See In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Report and 
Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17,905, 17,915 & n.46 (Dec. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Broadband Report & 
Order]. The FCC believes that broadband providers have at least three incentives for re-
stricting the availability of content on the Internet: First, broadband providers might block 
access to content to benefit its own affiliated offerings or they might be paid by competitors 
to limit the content of other competitors. Id. at 17,915. Second, broadband providers might 
seek to charge content providers a premium for prioritizing access to end users. Id. at 
17,919. Third, broadband providers, through prioritizing access for certain edge services, 
might degrade the quality of Internet service to other non-prioritized services. See id. at 
17,922. The FCC was so concerned by these perverse incentives that it first promulgated a 
set of principles for the openness of the Internet. See generally In re Appropriate Frame-
work for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 
F.C.C.R. 14,986 (2005). 
 2 Dina R. Richman, The Shot Heard Round the World Wide Web: Comcast Violates Net 
Neutrality, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 17, 17 (2008) (providing examples of legislation 
intended to ensure net neutrality). 
 3 Broadband Report & Order, supra note 1, at 17,911 & n.23 (noting that, for example, 
by “the late 1990s, a residential end user could download content at speeds not achievable 
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pany the increase in last-mile wireline speeds. First, there is an explosion of 
streaming video as the Internet’s dominant form of traffic and, second, there is 
a reconfiguration of the links in how large applications and content providers 
transmit their data to the outer edges of broadband service providers’ net-
works.4 
These shocks to the existing equilibrium have invoked varied responses by 
incumbent BSPs. For instance, BSPs have sought additional remuneration for 
the increased streaming from those content providers (such as Netflix) whose 
data are increasingly in demand by end users.5 The contrast between the large 
BSPs and the smaller BSPs in the perception of their responsibility to their end 
users for delivery of streaming video (from Internet video distributors such as 
Netflix, Hulu, or YouTube) is demonstrated by the conflict over the streaming 
of Netflix’s videos. Time Warner Communications has demanded that Netflix 
pay to transmit its content to end users.6 In contrast, the smaller BSPs, like 
RCN, have allowed Netflix to install its equipment into their data centers, 
which provides end users with a better viewing experience.7 The differing ap-
proaches reveal a stark difference between the large and small BSPs. Large 
BSPs have the leverage and the incentives to demand increased compensation 
from heavily trafficked content providers. Smaller BSPs are more likely to 
agree to arrangements that enable the end user to access stream content from 
the heavily trafficked providers. 
This article examines how large, vertically integrated BSPs (such as Com-
cast, Time Warner Cable, Verizon, AT&T, and Cablevision) are responding to 
the growth of online video distributors (“OVDs”) as emerging substitute pro-
viders of video programming. The large BSPs also operate as cable and satel-
lite companies that are known as multichannel video programming distributors 
(“MVPDs”). The OVDs compete with satellite and cable television companies. 
Therefore, the conflict arises from the dual roles played by large BSPs, who 
both distribute and produce video content. The conflict arises from the fact that 
the OVDs depend upon the bandwidth provided by their competitors—the sat-
                                                                                                             
even on the Internet backbone during the 1980s”). 
 4 John Markoff, Striving to Map the Shape-Shifting Net, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, at 
D1; see also id. at 17,911 & n.23. 
 5 Id. at 17,913; see also Jon Brodkin, Verizon Seeks Payment for Carrying Netflix Traf-
fic, WSJ Reports, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 19, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2014/02/verizon-seeks-payment-for-carrying-netflix-traffic-wsj-reports/ (dis-
cussing the tensions between Netflix and BSPs over streaming Netflix’s video content). 
 6 Jon Brodkin, Why YouTube Buffers: The Secret Deals That Make—and Break—
Online Video, ARS TECHNICA (July 28, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2013/07/why-youtube-buffers-the-secret-deals-that-make-and-break-online-
video/4/. 
 7 Id. 
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ellite and, especially, cable companies. 
BSPs’ response to the OVDs is analyzed along two dimensions. In Part II, 
the changing power relationship between BSPs, Internet backbone providers, 
and content delivery networks (“CDNs”) is examined. This shifting power dy-
namic stems from the proliferation of bandwidth-intensive content, applica-
tions, and services. To more fully understand the aspects of the competition 
between BSPs providing video distribution services and OVDs, it is important 
to incorporate into the analysis the entire communications link. The analysis 
should follow the content stream from the OVD’s server to the end user. The 
analysis should not be limited to focusing only on the “last mile”—that is, the 
link from the BSP’s router to the end user. In short, the growth of online video 
has caused a change in structure of Internet markets. 
In Part III, the relationship between BSPs, end users, and OVDs over the 
last mile is investigated with a focus on the role of specialized services as an 
option to the provision of Internet services offered through the BSP’s basic 
Internet access service (“BIAS”). This issue is examined in detail by consider-
ing two case studies: (1) Comcast’s decision to exempt its Xfinity video on 
demand service from data caps for its end users, and (2) the impact of the 
Comcast-NBCU merger on the provision of online services over last mile fa-
cilities. 
Part IV provides a brief conclusion. In short, it is concluded that the FCC 
must pay more attention in the formulation of openness rules to the linkages 
between interconnection issues, specialized services issues, and rules govern-
ing the treatment of traffic by BSPs. 
 
II. ISSUE 1—INTERCONNECTION DISPUTES AND THE BALANCE 
OF POWER 
 
In 2010, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) adopted the 
Open Internet Order.8 The Order mandated a limited set of openness rules that 
place legal responsibilities on BSPs, targeted to ensure the neutral treatment of 
all content, applications, or service providers’ traffic in the last mile.9 Specifi-
cally, BSPs are not allowed to block access to or to discriminate against con-
tent, applications, and service providers.10 The ability to discriminate against 
traffic is subject to a “no unreasonable discrimination” standard.11 To clarify 
                                                
 8 Broadband Report & Order, supra note 1, app. A; see also 47 C.F.R. § 8.1 (2011). 
 9 47 C.F.R. § 8.1 (2011); see also Broadband Report & Order, supra note 1, at 17,906, 
17,931. 
 10 47 C.F.R. §§ 8.5, 8.7 (2011). 
 11 47 C.F.R. § 8.7. 
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that standard, the FCC states that “a commercial arrangement between a 
broadband provider and a third party to directly or indirectly favor some traffic 
over other traffic in the broadband Internet access service connection to a sub-
scriber of the broadband provider (i.e. ‘pay for priority’) would raise signifi-
cant cause for concern.”12 The openness rules have important exceptions, such 
as not affecting existing networking-interconnection arrangements.13 These 
exceptions could enable BSPs to evade the spirit of the FCC’s openness goals, 
as demonstrated in the Comcast-Level 3 dispute analyzed below, and effec-
tively shift power to the BSPs in their relationships with other key stakeholders 
in the Internet ecosystem.14 In short, BSPs can engage legally in discriminatory 
conduct that falls outside the reach of the Open Internet rules. 
The regulatory focus on the public Internet and the last mile has caused 
BSPs to try different tactics to maintain their dominance.15 An example of the 
reaction of BSPs to the growth of streaming video can be examined by consid-
ering the dispute in 2010 between Level 3, an Internet backbone provider and 
CDN provider, and Comcast, the largest MVPD in the US and the subsequent 
reactions to it.16 Prior to the dispute, Level 3 and Comcast had a business rela-
tionship that consisted of two key components. As to the first component, 
Comcast was a transit customer of Level 3, that is, Comcast bought Internet 
capacity from Level 3.17 As to the second component, because Level 3 also 
operated as a CDN, it directly exchanged traffic (“on-net” traffic) with Com-
cast on a settlement-free basis.18 Comcast sought to renegotiate the business 
relationship with respect to Level 3’s CDN business in light of two significant, 
concurrent events. The demand for Internet video was growing (and continues 
to grow) at a phenomenal rate,19 primarily as the result of Netflix’s booming 
online business.20 Second, Level 3 contracted with Netflix, so Level 3 became 
                                                
 12 Broadband Report & Order, at 17,947. 
 13 Id. at 17,944 n.209. 
 14 Id. at 17,944 n.209, 17,965–66. 
 15 Nate Anderson, Peering Problems: Digging into the Comcast/Level 3 Grudgematch, 
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 9, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/12/comcastlevel3/ 
(discussing a new strategy used by Comcast). 
 16 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery 
of Video Programming, Fifteenth Report, 28 F.C.C.R. 10,496, 10,506 (2013) [hereinafter 
Delivery of Video Programming Report]. 
 17 Daniel Golding, The Real Story Behind the Comcast-Level 3 Battle, GIGAOM (Dec. 1, 
2010), http://gigaom.com/2010/12/01/comcast-level-3-battle/. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Jacob Minne, Data Caps: How ISPs are Stunting the Growth of Online Video 
Distributors and What Regulators can do about it, 65 FED COMM. L.J. 233, 242 (2012) (not-
ing that Internet video traffic is expected to rise from 37% to 62% by 2015). 
 20 Delivery of Video Programming Report, supra note 16, at 10,646. 
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Netflix’s Internet carrier for traffic requested by Netflix’s subscribers.21 Given 
these two events, Comcast demanded that Level 3 now pay to deliver “on-net” 
traffic to Comcast’s customers, a relationship referred to as “paid peering.”22 
Level 3 would then become for Comcast both a vendor of transit services and a 
customer of paid peering services.23 In summary, Comcast argued that it should 
be paid two times: once by its broadband subscribers and again by the Internet 
carrier delivering the video traffic directly to the local network. 
Comcast’s justification for the additional payment was based on the large 
imbalance of traffic it now directly exchanged with Level 3.24 Comcast argued 
that the increased traffic from Level 3 increased Comcast’s costs.25 Level 3 
complained that Comcast was violating the openness rules by raising the costs 
of online video delivery that can be considered as a substitute for aspects of 
Comcast’s video delivery.26 The parameters of the dispute can be understood 
by the answers to the two following questions. First, on what segment of cy-
berspace is the dispute located and how is the dispute related to the Open In-
ternet rules? Second, does the dispute reflect a change in the economic struc-
ture of Internet markets? 
Comcast portrayed the dispute as an ordinary peering dispute that only in-
volves one segment of the Internet: the upstream business relationship between 
a BSP and a backbone/CDN provider.27 Level 3 painted the dispute in broader 
terms, claiming that it demonstrated the “risk of a ‘closed’ Internet, where a 
retail [BSP] decides how their subscribers interact with content.”28 It is incor-
rect to focus only on one segment of the Internet, because the effects of deci-
sions centered on one segment impact other segments of the Internet. In eco-
nomic terms, a focus on the effects in one market is called a partial equilibrium 
                                                
 21 Golding, supra note 17. 
 22 Minne, supra note 19, at 241–43. 
 23 Anderson, supra note 15. 
 24 Id. (noting Comcast’s claim that it lacked the necessary infrastructure to meet Level 
3’s demands). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Press Release, Level 3, Level 3 Communications Issues Statement Concerning Com-
cast’s Actions (Nov. 29, 2010), 
http://level3.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=23600&item=65045 [hereinafter Level 3 Press 
Release]. 
 27 Letter from Joseph W. Was, Jr., Vice President, Comcast Corp., and Lynn R. Chary-
tan, Vice President, Comcast Corp., to Sharon Gillett, Chief of Wireline Competition Bu-
reau, F.C.C., at 1 (Nov. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.comcast.com/MediaLibrary/1/1/About/PressRoom/Documents/Comcastexparte1
130.pdf (“[D]espite Level 3’s effort to portray its dispute with Comcast as being about an 
‘open Internet,’ it is nothing but a good old-fashioned commercial peering dispute, the kind 
that Level 3 has found itself in before.”). 
 28 Level 3 Press Release, supra note 26. 
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analysis.29 A more complete examination of economic effects of a decision 
would utilize a general equilibrium analysis, which traces the effects in one 
market and how those effects impact related markets.30 Applying the general 
equilibrium analysis to the dispute indicates that a decision on one side of a 
BSP’s business (in this case, upstream access to the backbone of the Internet) 
also impacts the other sides of its business (in this case, downstream access to 
end users).31 
One purpose of the openness rules is to prevent vertically integrated BSPs 
from discriminating against unaffiliated content, applications, and service pro-
viders.32 The FCC argued that BSPs have both the ability and incentive to en-
gage in such discrimination.33 The rules focused on ensuring nondiscriminatory 
treatment of traffic over the last mile.34 This ignores how BSPs can outsource 
the discrimination upstream while still treating all packets neutrally in the last 
mile. As the FCC explains, “By interfering with the transmission of third par-
ties’ Internet-based services or raising the cost of online delivery for particular 
edge providers, telephone and cable companies can make those services less 
attractive to subscribers in comparison to their own offerings.”35 In economic 
terms, the basic concern is to prevent a BSP from leveraging its power over the 
last mile into adjacent markets. BSPs appear to have accomplished the “raising 
of rivals costs” by letting their interconnection ports fill up (meaning that there 
is insufficient capacity for the connections) in which they exchange traffic with 
backbone/CDN providers as video traffic has increased.36 This causes end users 
to experience poor streaming video quality when watching videos from OVDs, 
such as Netflix and YouTube.37 Large BSPs have responded to this traffic deg-
radation by imposing an additional charge on the backbone/CDN provider (for 
example, Level 3); and, in turn, the backbone/CDN provider will pass on the 
increased costs of sending traffic to its customers (for example, Netflix).38 
The FCC’s position has been that because the backbone segment of the In-
                                                
 29 The WTO explains that partial equilibrium analysis “focuses on one or multiple spe-
cific markets or products.” WTO, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TRADE POLICY ANALYSIS 8 
(2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wto_unctad12_e.pdf. 
 30 Id. 
 31 As the WTO notes, in the context of inter-market linkages, the general equilibrium 
analysis is preferred when the scope of the analysis is large and when the linkages are im-
portant. Id. at 181. 
 32 Broadband Report & Order, at 17,906, 17,915. 
 33 Id. at 17,915–18, 17,935. 
 34 Id. at 17,915–27 (focusing on the BSPs’ ability to degrade the streaming of content 
providers). 
 35 Id. at 17,918 (emphasis added). 
 36 Id. at 17,925–26. 
 37 Brodkin, supra note 6. 
 38 Anderson, supra note 15. 
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ternet does not reach the end user and because backbone/CDN providers do not 
directly compete with edge providers, there is little need for regulation of that 
segment.39 This has meant that interconnection arrangements for backbone traf-
fic have been negotiated without governmental intervention.40 Because video 
traffic has grown in importance and because there is a need for data-intensive 
video not to be subject to delay and interruption in delivery to end users, the 
economic leverage of BSPs has increased. 
The structure of Internet markets varies, depending upon the segment of the 
market. The structure of the markets for content, applications, and services—
the FCC refers to these as edge provider markets41—is highly competitive with 
limited barriers to entry.42 There are a variety of ways to traffic across the In-
ternet:43 they can use transit services provided by backbone providers, procure 
the services of a CDN to transmit data directly to the BSP’s network, or create 
their own CDN-like infrastructure.44 In short, edge providers have a range of 
options to transmit data. Backbone providers also face competition for the pro-
vision of transit and peering services.45 
The market for the provision of last mile broadband access is subject to a 
varying amount of competition, depending upon how the end user utilizes the 
broadband connection. For less data intensive uses, like accessing the web, 
wireless broadband complements the wireline broadband service; therefore, 
end users enjoy considerable choice among Internet last mile providers.46 
However, for highly data intensive uses, such as streaming online video, the 
choice among BSPs is much more limited. Table 1 demonstrates that if a resi-
dential end user is interested in purchasing a high-speed connection (for pur-
                                                
 39 Id. at 17,948 n.236. 
 40 Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1784 (2011) (“Eight years 
or more of intensive debate about network neutrality at the FCC have not even touched the 
proper treatment of network-to-network relationships in the Internet backbone.”); see also 
Randolph J. May, Level 3’s Retro Regulatory Advocacy: From Loopcos to Loopier, FREE 
ST. FOUND. (Feb. 21, 2011), http://freestatefoundation.blogspot.com/2011/02/level-3s-retro-
regulatory-vision-from.html. 
 41 Id. at 17,907 n.2. 
 42 Id. at 17,911. 
 43 Level 3 Press Release, supra note 26.  
 44 See Anna-Maria Kovacs, Internet Peering and Transit, TECH POL’Y INST. 1, 9–12 
(2012), available at 
https://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/amkinternetpeeringandtransit.pdf. A few of the 
large content providers have created their own CDN-like networks.  Id. at 12. 
 45 Id. at 13 (quoting an executive officer of Level 3 as saying that backbone providers’ 
services are only one choice of many that are available to edge providers). 
 46 JOHN B. HORRIGAN, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, BROADBAND ADOP-
TION AND USAGE: WHAT HAS FOUR YEARS TAUGHT US? 3–4 (2013), available at 
http://www.jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/MTI%20Remarks%20-
%20Broadband%20Adoption%20-%202.6.13.pdf. 
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poses of this article that is defined as at least a downstream speed of 10 Mbps) 
cable modem is by far the most likely choice with fiber connections a distant 
second. From 2007 to June 2012, aDSL’s percentage of residential use de-
clined, where cable’s residential use increased.47 In the last several years, the 
overwhelming majority of new high-speed broadband subscribers are ac-
counted for by cable operators.48 It has been argued that “in many parts of the 
country a de facto monopoly on high-speed broadband service [has] resulted in 
slow innovation and poor customer service.”49 
 
Table 1: Residential Connections by Downstream Speed Tier, Technology, 
and Date 
TECHNOLOGY CONNECTION SPEED 
  Less Than 10 Mbps At Least 10 Mbps 
 June 30, 2012* 
aDSL 28,556,000   2,630,000   
Cable Modem 14,807,000   34,856,000   
Satellite 1,123,000  0  
Fiber 601,000   5,698,000   
Mobile Wireless 149,792,000   0   
 December 31, 2010** 
aDSL 30,608,000   847,000   
Cable Modem 17,719,000   27,592,000   
Satellite Data withheld  0  
Fiber 537,000   4,451,000   
Mobile Wireless 84,396,000   0   
     
Sources: 
* INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTER-
NET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2012, at 30 tbl. 10 
(2013), available at 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2013/db1224/D
OC-324884A1.pdf (providing the 2012 data).  
                                                
 47 INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERV-
ICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2012, at 27, chart 11 (2013), available at 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2013/db1224/DOC-324884A1.pdf. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See Timothy B. Lee, Five Things Neither Side of the Broadband Debate Wants to 
Admit, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/09/17/5-things-neither-side-of-the-broadband-debate-wants-to-admit/. 
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** INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTER-
NET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 31 tbl. 12 
(2011), available at 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2013/db1224/D
OC-324884A1.pdf (providing the 2010 data).  
     
  Given the lack of effective competition in high-speed, last mile broadband 
connections, it is reasonable to argue that it made sense for the FCC to impose 
openness rules on BSPs to ensure that they do not leverage this power into ad-
jacent markets. The economic concern should be to protect content, applica-
tions, and service providers that offer competing services to BSPs that are ver-
tically integrated, especially with respect to voice and video services, the leg-
acy services of the dominant BSPs. However, the exclusive focus on the last 
mile has caused the FCC to ignore how BSPs can exercise market power via 
discriminatory behavior in other segments of the Internet. 
For example, the Open Internet Order states unequivocally that BSPs cannot 
impose termination fees on edge providers for delivering or carrying traffic to 
its end users.50 Despite this categorical statement, the FCC explains that there is 
a large exception to the openness rules: the rules do not apply to existing net-
work interconnection arrangements, an apparent reference to the Level 3-
Comcast dispute.51 The juxtaposition of these statements seems to indicate that 
the FCC accepts that the two segments, the last mile segment and the upstream 
segment to the backbone, are independent of each other. The FCC fails to rec-
ognize that the carve-out for existing network-interconnection arrangements 
provides a method by which BSPs can evade the no blocking rule, because, 
from the end user’s perspective, there is no practical difference between block-
ing traffic and degrading interconnection ports. Degrading interconnection 
ports and blocking traffic are two activities that interfere with the end user’s 
access to content. In fact, several paragraphs earlier in the same section of the 
FCC rules, the FCC agrees that “degrading traffic can have the same effects as 
outright blocking.”52 The FCC’s exception for existing network-
interconnection arrangements allows BSPs to exercise market power over un-
affiliated content, applications, and service providers without violating the let-
ter of the Open Internet Order. 
Given this regulatory loophole, the growth of online video, and a trend to-
                                                
 50 Broadband Report & Order, at 17,943–44. 
 51 Id. at 17,944 n.209. 
 52 Id. at 17,943 (“The Commission has recognized that in some circumstances the dis-
tinction between blocking and degrading (such as by delaying) traffic is merely ‘seman-
tic.’”). 
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ward consolidation of the BSP market, the balance of power has shifted be-
tween BSPs and backbone/CDN providers in favor of BSPs.53 The Level 3 and 
Comcast dispute is an early first sign of this change in the balance of power.54 
Given the Internet’s architecture, backbone providers had acted as a buffer that 
prevented BSPs from exercising control over content, applications, and service 
providers. That buffer zone is beginning to disappear as large BSPs accumulate 
more subscribers and expand into the provision of backbone services.55 For 
instance, the four largest providers of broadband Internet (Comcast, Time 
Warner, AT&T, and Verizon) account for almost 70% of all broadband sub-
scribers.56 The subscriber count as of the end of the second quarter 2013 is as 
follows: Comcast has 19,986,000; AT&T has 16,453,000; Time Warner has 
11,559,000; and Verizon has 8,939,000.57 Large BSPs, like Comcast, are likely 
to demand, on an increasing basis, payment from backbone/CDN providers to 
supply direct connections to their subscribers.58 
Furthermore, large BSPs are reluctant to accept CDN-like equipment from 
edge providers to be placed inside the data centers of BSPs. For example, Net-
flix has created its own CDN and offers to place their storage equipment in or 
near the BSP’s network; however, Comcast has not accepted Netflix’s offer.59 
Many smaller BSPs found the offer very attractive, because it would enhance 
the viewing experience of its broadband subscribers.60 For example, Sonic.net, 
a BSP located in California with 50,000 subscribers, embraced the offer since 
                                                
 53 See Timothy B. Lee, Keeping the Internet Competitive, Spring-2012 NAT’L AFF. 59, 
74 (2012) (discussing the power of Comcast (a BSP) over Level 3 and other backbone pro-
viders, stating that “Comcast’s leverage over backbone providers has grown with its share of 
the broadband market . . . It seems increasingly clear that the economic model of the 
[I]nternet is changing”). 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. at 70. In addition, backbone carriers are experiencing pressure from the other 
side of their market segment as major content providers are expanding facilities investments 
in the Internet backbone. See, e.g., Drew Fitzgerald & Spencer E. Ante, Tech Firms Push to 
Control Web’s Pipes, Wall St. J. (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304173704579262361885883936. 
 56 Press Release, Leichtman Research Grp., About 295,000 Add Broadband in the Sec-
ond Quarter of 2013, at 2 (Aug. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/082013release.pdf. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See Lee, supra note 53, at 73 (discussing the regime envisioned by Comcast: back-
bone providers pay the BSPs for the increased traffic); see also Level 3 Press Release, supra 
note 26 (calling such tactics a “toll booth at the borders of [the BSP’s] broadband Internet 
access network”).  
 59 Overview: Netflix Open Connect Content Delivery Network, NETFLIX, 
https://signup.netflix.com/openconnect (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) (omitting Comcast, Time 
Warner Cable, and Verizon from the list of ISPs that have connected to Netflix’s CDN). 
 60 Brodkin, supra note 6 (citing RCN’s—a smaller BSP—explanation as to why it ac-
cepts Netflix’s equipment: to enhance their customers’ viewing experience). 
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it would reduce the costs that Netflix traffic imposes on its operations.61 RCN 
does experience a small increase in costs to house the equipment but the costs 
are outweighed by benefits in the form of a reduction in costs to the BSP for 
transit payments and the more reliable streaming experience for its customers.62 
On the other hand, Comcast and Time Warner rejected the offer since they ex-
pect payment from CDNs and Netflix. Instead, Netflix is offering a free service 
to the BSP.63  
There are competing arguments for “who should pay who” in interconnec-
tion arrangements. First, one can try to identify who causes the traffic flow, 
end users or edge providers. Edge providers argue that it is end users who de-
mand/pull the data and, thus, it is the responsibility of the BSP to ensure that 
its subscribers have the ability to access data with sufficient capacity and func-
tionality to accommodate the requests both within the local network and at 
points of interconnection with other networks.64 BSPs counter that it is the re-
sponsibility of edge providers to ensure that the data arrives in a reliable and 
usable form to end users.65 To some extent, BSPs are falling back on a “sender 
pays” model rooted in telecommunications history,66 which inappropriately 
imposes a telecommunications framework on the Internet. Second, and relat-
edly, BSPs argue that when traffic flows become unbalanced, the party respon-
sible for sending more traffic should pay.67 This tradition is also rooted in tele-
communications history.68 The question arises whether it is a legitimate busi-
ness justification to impose a recurring charge on backbone/CDN providers to 
                                                
 61 Id. 
 62 For discussion of the Sonic.net case, see Stacey Higginbotham, Peering Pressure: 
The Secret Battle to Control the Future of the Internet, GIGAOM (June 19, 2013), 
http://gigaom.com/2013/06/19/peering-pressure-the-secret-battle-to-control-the-future-of-
the-internet/. For a discussion of the RCN case, see Brodkin, supra note 6. 
 63 For background, see Brodkin, supra note 6. Netflix tried to induce large BSPs to ac-
cept its offer by tying access to its highest quality video formats to acceptance of its CDN 
equipment. Larry Downes, The Strange Resurrection of Net Neutrality, CNET NEWS (Jan. 
24, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57565561-38/the-strange-resurrection-of-
net-neutrality/. This may have been a strategic mistake since Netflix then was accused of 
denying its own subscribers access to content in these formats and subsequently Netflix 
removed the tie. For such an accusation, see id. 
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account for out-of-balance traffic. However, it can be legitimately argued that 
this model is inapplicable given the architecture of last mile facilities that are 
designed in an asymmetric fashion. That is, Internet networks are designed by 
cable operators to provide much more capacity for end users to download traf-
fic than to upload traffic.69 Third, one of the most economically relevant deter-
mination of ‘who pays’ is based on which party possesses the economic lever-
age in the negotiation. The more powerful party is likely to be the recipient of 
revenue.70 This is what appears to be changing in the Internet as video traffic 
comes to dominant the data usage of networks.71 
As demand for video streaming alters the economics of traffic exchanges on 
the Internet, it appears that (1) BSPs are likely to become gatekeepers to the 
last mile for which they face limited or no competition for data intensive ac-
tivities, and (2) it will become more costly to build a business on the Internet 
and, thus, more likely to reduce the growth of innovation by edge providers. 
Based on first impressions, it is unlikely that the new administration at the 
FCC will object to this emerging change in the balance of power. In comments 
by the new FCC Chairman in his first formal public address, he indicated what 
appears to be an endorsement of payments from edge providers to BSPs, a con-
tradiction with the prevailing norms of the Internet.72 
 
III. ISSUE 2—SPECIALIZED SERVICE VERSUS BASIC INTERNET 
ACCESS SERVICE 
 
The focus of the second issue is on the last mile access network, which is the 
segment of the BSP’s network that is closest to the end user, and most relevant 
to the provision of specialized services that utilize this shared local infrastruc-
ture. In the Open Internet Order, the FCC permitted BSPs to offer specialized 
services over last mile connections to end-users. Furthermore, and most impor-
tantly, such services are not subject to the Open Internet rules (i.e., transpar-
ency, no blocking, and no unreasonable discrimination).73 In the Open Internet 
Order, specialized services are defined as: 
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[S]ervices that share capacity with broadband Internet access services over 
providers’ last-mile facilities, and may develop and offer other such services in 
the future. These “specialized services,” such as some broadband providers’ 
existing facilities-based VoIP and Internet Protocol-video offerings, differ 
from broadband Internet access service and drive additional private investment 
in broadband networks and provide end users valued services, supplementing 
the benefits of the open Internet.74 
Thus, over the same last mile broadband connection, an end user can access 
three types of services: IP-based specialized services (not subject to the Open 
Internet rules), IP-based BIAS (subject to the Open Internet rules), and legacy 
services such as traditional cable television service and phone service (subject 
to pre-existing rules specific to the classification of the service).75 This means 
that an end user can use the connection to purchase traditional pay-television 
or an IP-based pay television service (IPTV) from a cable or telephone opera-
tor and, over the same connection, purchase from an unaffiliated online dis-
tributor a competitive video service. As with the situation for the issue ana-
lyzed in Part II, multiple modes of content distribution over the same platform 
present the possibility of conflicting incentives on the part of vertically inte-
grated BSPs. 
The most important reason for permitting BSPs to offer specialized services 
is based on economic incentives with particular reference to stimulating in-
vestment and product innovation.76 This means that an end user can use the 
connection to purchase traditional pay-television or an IP-based pay television 
service (IPTV) from a cable or telephone operator and, over the same connec-
tion, purchase from an unaffiliated online distributor a competitive video serv-
ice. As with the situation for the issue analyzed in Part II, multiple modes of 
content distribution over the same platform present the possibility of conflict-
ing incentives on the part of vertically integrated BSPs. 
The most important reason for permitting BSPs to offer specialized services 
is based on economic incentives with particular reference to stimulating in-
vestment and product innovation. In order to entice BSPs to invest in advanced 
broadband capacity in last mile connections, the economic case is dependent 
on generating revenue from the provision of multiple and, in some cases, new 
IP-based services.77 Therefore, the trade-off to enhance the provision of capac-
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ity for BIAS meant that BSPs effectively could offer private broadband chan-
nels dedicated to innovative services (such as those requiring an enhanced 
quality of service compared to the level of service provided by BIAS).78 Such 
services theoretically could not be provided over public broadband channels 
associated with BIAS. The ability to offer a service with an enhanced quality 
of service seems to confer a competitive advantage to the BSP compared to a 
somewhat similar service that relies on BIAS. Nevertheless, it is the expecta-
tion of the FCC that provision of specialized services will supplement (and not 
supplant) the benefits of the Open Internet.79 
It is also recognized that these benefits from the provision of specialized 
services must be weighed against the potential costs of permitting private serv-
ices.80 First, one concern involves the incentive a BSP has to label a service as 
a specialized service that otherwise could be provided over a public, non-
discriminatory channel in order to evade the consumer protections embodied in 
the Open Internet rules.81 Second, a concern arises regarding incentives for the 
BSP in its decisions on how much total bandwidth to provision in the last mile 
and how to allocate the total bandwidth between public and private channels.82 
At one time, the investment and allocation decisions were determined, in large 
part, by technological considerations but, now, it has become mostly a business 
decision.83 Third, a concern involves the incentive of BSPs to use specialized 
services to engage in anticompetitive conduct against unaffiliated online pro-
viders of close substitutes.84 
The FCC’s discussion of specialized services in the Open Internet Order was 
relatively brief.85 Instead, the FCC created an Open Internet Advisory Commit-
tee (OIAC) to monitor, in part, the on-going development of specialized serv-
ices by BSPs to ensure that they do not generate the types of concerns de-
scribed above.86 In August 2013, the Specialized Services Working Group of 
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the OIAC issued its portion of the annual report.87 The first issue the Working 
Group addressed involved identifying the parameters of exactly what types of 
services can be classified as specialized services and, thus, not subject to the 
Open Internet regulatory framework.88 In this discussion, possible limits on the 
provision of and characteristics of specialized services are introduced. 
The Working Group identified the following types of considerations to de-
fine and characterize a specialized service: (a) what is the reach of the service, 
(b) does the service utilize capacity on last mile facilities, (c) is the service’s 
use of capacity isolated from public Internet channels, (d) is the service a gen-
eral service or an application-level service, and (e) does the service require 
treatment (such as an enhanced level of quality) that otherwise would not be 
available over the “best efforts” level of service provided by BIAS.89 In order 
to be classified as a specialized service and, thus, be set apart from other IP-
based services that are subject to the Open Internet rules, the Working Group 
suggested the following answers: (a) the service is not able to reach large parts 
(endpoints) of the Internet, (b) the service does utilize capacity on the last mile 
facilities, (c) the service’s use of capacity is isolated from (i.e., does not im-
pact/interfere with) the capacity allocated to BIAS, (d) the service is a specific, 
application level service, and (e) the service requires a capability in order to 
provide the service that could not be provided over the public Internet.90 
As a basis of comparison, if one considered the BIAS provided by BSPs that 
provide access to OVDs such as Netflix, the answers to the above considera-
tions are as follows: (a) the service is intended to reach virtually all endpoints 
on the Internet, (b) the service does use capacity on the last mile facilities, (c) 
the service provides access to multiple applications and content providers that 
all utilize the same capacity allocated to public channels, (d) the service is a 
general service over the top of which multiple Internet services can be provi-
sioned, and (e) the service is designed to utilize protocols associated with the 
treatment of packets in a “best efforts” manner.91 
Consideration (e) is critical and is a limiting factor, because an underlying 
rationale for exempting specialized services from the Open Internet rules is to 
preserve and enhance the incentives for BSPs to engage in investment and in-
novation that will supplement the innovative opportunities using the public 
Internet.92 Stated differently, the BSP should not use the specialized services 
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classification as a way to avoid regulation but, rather, as a way to enhance in-
novation. This concern about evading Internet regulations is explored by ana-
lyzing the case involving Comcast’s decision in March 2012 to exempt its 
Xfinity TV video on-demand service from a consumer’s data cap when viewed 
on the Xbox video game console, an Internet-enabled device.93 This decision 
led to an outcry by Open Internet proponents that Comcast’s streaming video 
on demand service was violating the openness rules.94 
The Xfinity controversy seems to conflate two distinct issues. First, Com-
cast considered a customer’s use of the Xfinity application when watched over 
the Xbox video game console to be exempt from the customer’s monthly data 
cap.95 Second, Comcast argued that the flow of Xfinity traffic is not provi-
sioned over a public Internet channel but rather is provisioned differently, as an 
IP serving of cable TV service.96 Each issue must be considered separately. 
Suppose Comcast decided to exempt the use of the Xfinity application from its 
data cap when its content is viewed through use of the Xbox video game con-
sole; the Xbox effectively then becomes a substitute receiver for the cable set 
top box. If, instead, the customer watched the same content by using the serv-
ices of an OVD, then the data viewed counts against the customer’s monthly 
data cap.97 On the surface, this appears to be a discriminatory practice, not be-
cause of differential treatment of traffic on the last mile but in the economic 
consequences of the traffic.98 In defense of the practice, it is argued that “[t]he 
Xbox exemption merely allows customers to watch traditional cable consump-
tion on television using the Xbox rather than a traditional set-top box as the 
conduit.”99 However, if the data for the Comcast service and the OVD service 
are provided utilizing the customer’s BIAS service, the difference in economic 
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treatment is arguably discriminatory. 
A related issue arises if an unaffiliated content provider wished to pay a fee 
to the BSP to exempt the customer’s use of that edge provider’s content from 
the data cap applied to the BIAS.100 Although at first glance such a proposal 
appears to have discriminatory effects, it is possible to posit legitimate busi-
ness justifications for such a business practice.101 A key consideration is 
whether the BSP makes such an offer available to similarly situated, unaffili-
ated content providers. In the Xfinity case, the exemption only applied to 
Comcast’s video on demand service.102 
The second issue implicated in the Comcast case is somewhat confusing. 
Comcast argues that the delivery of Xfinity content to the Xbox video game 
console is isolated from the bandwidth allocated to BIAS.103 In this respect, it 
looks to possess one of the necessary conditions for a specialized service and, 
thus, not subject to a nondiscrimination rule. Based on how Comcast says it 
provisions the service,104 it appears to meet the five characteristics described 
above. If so classified, then, making an argument that the data used by the 
service is not subject to the customer’s monthly data cap associated with BIAS 
is irrelevant. The creation of the specialized service category means that such a 
service can provide an enhanced quality of service and need not be subject to 
other conditions imposed on BIAS. More confusing, Comcast says that use of 
the Xfinity application on other Internet-enabled devices such as computers 
and tablets is subject to the customer’s monthly data cap.105 It is only data sent 
to an Xbox video game console that is exempt.106 This differential treatment 
raises several questions. Does the data sent to other devices use public Internet 
capacity and, thus, one reverts back to the first issue addressed. Why is only 
the data sent to an Xbox video game console utilizing a private channel? Does 
it make sense that the same application is classified differently depending on 
the Internet-enabled device utilized to receive the data? This case demands 
further examination by regulatory authorities to understand fully the reasons 
for the Xfinity exemption from data caps.107 
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As discussed above, specialized services were not subject to any specific 
limitations in the Open Internet Order but that soon changed when the FCC 
and the Department of Justice imposed conditions to permit the Comcast-
NBCU merger in 2011.108 In 2009, Comcast, the nation’s largest BSP, proposed 
a joint venture with NBCU, one of the major providers of broadcast and cable 
programming.109 The vertical merger was eventually approved in 2011 but 
there were restrictions imposed that affected the way in which Comcast would 
be able to deliver Internet services.110 An emphasis of the merger conditions 
was to protect the growth of OVDs, potential competitors to Comcast’s video 
programming delivery business.111 First, with respect to services provided over 
the public Internet, Comcast must treat other OVD services just as it treats its 
own Internet-based video services.112 This condition is justified based on the 
types of issues addressed in the Open Internet Order that examined the incen-
tive and ability of a vertically integrated BSP to discriminate in its treatment of 
traffic utilizing BIAS.113 Effectively, this means that Comcast will be subject to 
many of the provisions of the Open Internet Order until 2018 even if the judi-
cial process overturns or remands all or parts of the Open Internet Order.114 
Furthermore, Comcast must also subject its traffic to any usage-based billing 
plans, such as data caps, that applies to OVD traffic.115 This merger condition 
has led net neutrality proponents to argue that the Xfinity case, discussed 
above, is a violation of the merger agreement as well as an antitrust violation.116 
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Second, with respect to specialized services that are offered over the same 
last mile facilities as BIAS, Comcast must “ensure that OVDs will have access 
to any Specialized Service Comcast may offer that includes comparable serv-
ices.”117 In practicality, this applies an open access mandate for Comcast’s pri-
vate Internet channels for rival OVDs. This could become a controversial is-
sue, given the unrelenting growth in the demand for video services over the 
Internet.118 Also, merger conditions narrowed the definition of specialized serv-
ices compared to that offered in the Open Internet Order, thus, subjecting addi-
tional services to the Open Internet rules specifically for Comcast.119 
Broadband Internet access service, video services regulated under Title VI, and 
existing VoIP telephony services are not to be treated as specialized services.120 
Lastly, in order to protect the public Internet from being starved for capac-
ity, a merger condition instructs Comcast to “maintain its public Internet ac-
cess service at a level that typically would allow any user on the network to 
download content from the public Internet at speeds of at least 12 megabits per 
second in markets where it has deployed DOCSIS 3.0.”121 Again, this reflects 
the interest of governmental authorities in protecting the development of 
OVDs. One can see that the governmental authorities anticipated that a deci-
sion on the allocation of capacity between public and private channels could be 
used by BSPs to limit the growth and competitiveness of OVDs. Since such a 
similar adverse allocation decision could be made by any BSP, it seems rea-




Just about everyone agrees that the Internet has been and should remain 
open. However, precisely what does open mean and whether the government 
should mandate such a feature is the subject of much debate. The Open Inter-
net Order created rules to preserve the openness feature of the public Internet 
over the last mile. These rules are calibrated based on appropriate economic 
concerns that vertically integrated BSPs with market power are positioned to 
engage in anticompetitive behavior toward unaffiliated edge providers generat-
ing harmful effects on end users. The FCC response to address these concerns 
is confined to actions that BSPs can take in terms of blocking or engaging in 
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unreasonable discrimination in the public channels over the last mile. This lim-
ited focus fails to account for actions that BSPs can take with respect to inter-
connection agreements that can frustrate the objectives of the openness rules. 
To begin to address this concern, a first step would be to invoke a transparency 
requirement for interconnection agreements so governmental authorities and 
other interested parties can understand the economics underlying the specified 
terms and conditions of interconnection. In addition, the ability of vertically 
integrated BSPs to use specialized services to circumvent the openness rules 
still remains a viable option. Governmental authorities addressed this concern 
with specific conditions imposed on Comcast’s Internet services during the 
Comcast-NBCU merger process. Extension of these types of conditions to all 
vertically integrated BSPs with market power should be considered as a logical 
next step for regulatory action. 
 
